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THE LATE TWENTIETH-CENTURY WAR 
ON THE POOR: A VIEW FROM 
DISTRESSED COMMUNITIES 
THROUGHOUT THE NATION 
JACQUELINE JONES* 
The American economy of the mid-1990s reveals all of the social 
contradictions, all of the complex cross-currents, of the post-industrial 
age. In 1994, corporate profits soared by 30 percent, and meaner, 
leaner companies boasted that they were now "recession proof," im-
mune to future downswings in the economy.l These companies have 
met the challenge of a new world economic order; they have stream-
lined and downsized, cut back and consolidated, and in the process 
have emerged triumphantly competetive in the world marketplace.2 
On the other hand, workers are rewarded for their unprecedented 
productivity with wage cuts and benefit give-backs on union contracts, 
and with an avalanche of pink slips.3 The number of Americans work-
ing long hours at two or more jobs is increasing, and the poverty rate 
is growing, even as Congress continues to shred what little of the safety 
net remains for those who are victims of a transformed economy. And 
yet, rather than grappling with the social manifestations of large-scale 
economic change, politicians and policy makers persist in focusing on 
the alleged immorality of the poor. Indeed, beleagured poor women 
of all races now serve as scapegoats for all of the nation's ills, real and 
imagined. The same economy that produces profits for corporate 
stockholders produces poverty for the unemployed and the employed 
alike. 
Within the academy, poverty studies conducted by social scientists 
aid and abet the current process by which poor people are objectified 
and blamed for the changes in the job structure that have robbed them 
of their jobs, their health benefits, their livelihoods, and their dignity. 
* Ph.D. University of Wisconsin, Madison; Harry S. Truman Professor of American Civiliza-
tion, Brandeis University. Professor Jones is also the author of THE DISPOSESSED: AMERICA'S 
UNDERCLASS FROM THE CIVIL WAR To THE PRESENT; LABOR OF LOVE, LABOR OF SORROW. 
1 James Sterngold, Facing the Next Recession Without Fear: Newly Lean Cuporations Expect to 
Do Fine When the Tough Times Come, N.Y. TIMES, May 9,1995, at Dl, D5. 
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A prime example of this particular approach to the study of poverty is 
the book The Bell Curve: Intelligence and Class Structure in American 
Life, by llichardJ. Herrnstein and Charles Murray.4 While some might 
argue that this work has received more than its share of criticism from 
mainstream scholars, and that it represents an extreme view within the 
social-scientific community, I would suggest otherwise. In several re-
spects The Bell Curve is in fact representative of the current political 
and academic discourse about the nature and meaning of poverty.5 
First, the book ignores history as a factor affecting the way American 
society is structured today.6 According to the authors, racial discrimi-
nation was pretty much eliminated from the workplace in the mid-
1960s; hence all forms of inequality in the 1990s-residential segrega-
tion, income differentials, the social organization of labor-reflect not 
historic patterns of spatial and economic development, but rather the 
IQ, or general intelligence, of people presently living in the country.7 
According to Herrnstein and Murray, as a society we must dispense 
with misguided attempts to redeem the poor through schooling or 
affirmative action; rather we must learn to accept the fact that some 
people will always be smart-that is, rich-and some people will always 
be, in the authors' words, "dumb"-that is, poor.s "llights talk" is 
therefore so much whining about the inequality inherent in the natu-
ral order of society. 
The Bell Curve also conforms to larger trends in social-scientific 
inquiry by virtue of its preoccupation with Mrican Americans, and its 
attempts to sensationalize the danger and alleged degradation of the 
communities in which they live.9 Indeed, the book is a prime example 
of "underclass" studies, those works that purport to examine poverty 
but in fact consider only one manifestation of it-the inner-city north-
ern black ghetto-and then go on to argue that poor black folks 
adhere to a "culture" which is the root of all of their problems. lo 
(Meanwhile, in absolute numbers the white poor outnumber the black 
poor by two to one, II and the regional locus of black poverty is in the 
4 See generally RICHARD]' HERRNSTEIN & CHARLES MURRAY, THE BELL CURVE: INTELLIGENCE 
AND CLASS STRUCTURE IN AMERICAN LIFE (1994). 
5 See id. 
6 See id. 
7 See id. at 506-07, 519-20. 
8 See id. at 177, 200-01. 
9 See generally id. 
10 See id. 
11 CENSUS REpORT 1990. 
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rural South, and larger northern metropolitan areas, not in the inner-
city at all.) Finally, Herrnstein and Murray exhibit a fashionable fasci-
nation with the powers imputed to poor women.12 In their view, these 
women are the agents of "dysgenesis," that is, the process by which 
"dumb" babies depress the collective IQofthe nation over timeYTheir 
alarmist predictions about the descent of American society into strife 
and squalor provide the scholarly context for discussions of "family 
values" and "welfare reform," euphemisms for the war on the poor 
currently being waged in the halls of state legislatures and the offices 
of Capitol Hill. 
By focusing on the phenomenon of multiethnic, multiracial dis-
tressed communities throughout the United States today, we are able 
to free ourselves from the conceptual apparatus with which the "un-
derclass" theorists have constrained us. The so-called "family crisis" in 
these poor communities is not a cause of larger social ills, but rather 
a symptom of historic economic transformations. We should avoid 
moralistic generalizations about poor people and instead locate them 
in a specific time and place-late twentieth century post-industrial 
America. "Family values" are not the exclusive province of the white 
middle-class. Indeed, families in a wide variety of distressed communi-
ties are staggering under the weight of a new world economic order: 
their struggles are less related to a crisis in values, or culture, than to 
a crisis in politics. 
In the United States today, increasing numbers of people, and 
increasing numbers of whole communities, are becoming economi-
cally superfluous. By my conservative estimate, fully one-fourth of all 
Americans are poor or near-poor; these are families that find it difficult 
to pay the rent, buy new shoes for their children, and put food on the 
table at the end of the month. This figure includes not only families 
with parents who are out of work, but also families whose members 
work for long hours at part-time jobs that pay little and carry with them 
little in the way of benefits like health care. Thus to the 1990 U. S. 
census poverty estimate of 36.9 million poor, I would add another 26 
million people who subsist just a pink slip or a health-care emergency 
away from complete and utter disaster.14 
12 See generally HERRNSTEIN, supra note 4. 
13 See id. at 341--68. 
14 See]oHN E. SCHARZ AND THOMAS]' VOLGY, THE FORGOTTEN AMERICANS (1992). 
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I. THE HISTORIES OF SOME DISTRESSED COMMUNITIES 
Despite the messages we receive from the nightly news and Con-
gressional debates to the contrary, distressed communities are scat-
tered throughout the country, and they are home to a number and 
variety of ethnic and racial groups. These communities have different 
histories; they have followed different historical trajectories of devel-
opment, or decay, but today they all have certain structural charcteris-
tics in common, and the people who live in them encounter similar 
barriers to their economic and physical well being. 
Let me briefly describe the histories of several of these communities: 
In the Midwest and southern Piedmont, industrial workers have 
been displaced by advanced technology and competition from foreign 
imports.15 Steel workers in Indiana, auto workers in Michigan, rubber 
workers in Ohio, and textile workers in Georgia and the Carolinas have 
all paid a heavy price for the elimination of international trade barri-
ers, a development that encourages companies to consolidate their 
operations, and innovate technolgically. Computers and robotics testify 
to the genius of American enterprise, the adaptability of American 
businesses, but the efficiency of these machines results in a decline in 
the demand for labor, and as a result wreaks havoc on workers and 
their families. The recent history of the steel industry suggest the 
continued vulnerablity of workers, even those employed in reorganized 
industries. Devastated by cheap foreign imports in the 1970s, United 
States steel manufacturers abandoned the gigantic, inefficient plants 
that had for so many years dominated the landscape in cities like Gary, 
Indiana, and Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. Steel mini-mills emerged to 
take the place of these sprawling structures; the mini-mills produced 
steel more efficiently, and at a fraction of the labor force, and labor 
costs, compared to the old plants.16 However, by the mid-1990s, com-
petition among these newcomers had increased to the point that the 
weaker ones were being quickly weeded out in favor of their more 
innovative counterparts. In 1994, the total number of workers em-
ployed in the nation's steel industry was 171,000, compared to 512,000 
fourteen years beforeP 
15 See, e.g., KATHRYN MARIE DUDLEY, THE END OF THE LINE: LOST JOBS, NEW LIVES IN 
POSTINDUSTRIAL AMERICA (1994). 
16 See John Holusha, Steel Mini-Mills Could Bring Boon or Blood Bath, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 
1995, at Dl. 
17Id. at D8. 
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On the West and East Coasts, migratory agricultural laborers toil 
in the fields for long hours at little pay. IS Originally consisting of black 
and white sharecroppers displaced by tractors and other forms of farm 
technology, the East Coast migrant labor stream now includes workers 
from Haiti, Cambodia, Laos, and Brazil, as well as, Native Americans 
and Mrican Americans. These workers exist outside the welfare state; 
they lack coverage from federal legislation related to unemployment 
compensation, overtime pay, minimum wage laws, and the health and 
safety standards established by the Occupational Safety and Health Act. 
The working conditions of migrant men, women, and children have 
actually deteriorated as a result of the extensive use of toxic pesticides 
in the fields. A 1992 General Accounting Office report noted that 
agricultural ranked with construction and mining as the nation's most 
hazardous jobs, and it was estimated that in 1990, four out of ten 
migrant children at work in western New York state had suffered from 
contact with pesticides in the fields. 19 Because of their inadequate 
housing, they are also at risk for tuberculosis. The home base for East 
Coast migrants, Belle Glade, Florida, has an extraordinarily high rate 
of people suffering from HIV, and living conditions, in general, in that 
town rival the worst anywhere in the nation.20 
In other parts of the South, the remnants of the cotton plantation 
system have left a bitter legacy for the descendants of slaves.21 In the 
Mississippi Delta, for example, the lack of quality education, and good 
jobs at good wages, suggest the difficulties facing parents who want 
their children to live a better life than they have had.22 In some cases, 
even new industries hold little promise in the long run for these 
families. 23 For example, in Indianola, the catfish industry depends on 
a workforce that is largely black, female, and poor.24 However, not only 
do the fish processing jobs pay little, they are also vulnerable to larger 
market forces. 25 In 1990, a strike of900 workers at the Delta Pride plant 
resulted in modest wage increases and better working conditions, but 
soon after, the whole industry began to institute cutbacks to counter 
18 See Stan Grossfeld, Children of the Harvest, BOSTON SUNDAY GLOBE, April 30, 1995, at 74. 
19Id. 
20 See Kenneth G. Castro et aI., Transmission of HIV in Belle Glade, Flurida: Lessons for Other 
Communities in the United States, 239 SCIENCE 193 (1988). 
21 See generally JAMES C. COBB, THE MOST SOUTHERN PLACE ON EARTH: THE MISSISSIPPI 
DELTA AND THE ROOTS OF SOUTHERN IDENTITY (1992). 
22 See id. at 331-32. 
23 See id. 
24 See id. at 330; Eric Bates, The Kill Line, 19 S. EXPOSURE 23 (1991). 
25 See Cobb, supra note 21, at 331. 
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the effects of a saturated market.26 This case illustrates the thread of 
continuity linking a slave past to a postindustrial present; where black 
women once chopped and picked cotton for white landowners, they 
now stand for hours and each rip and gut as many as 20,000 fish a 
day.27 Where they once suffered from back-breaking stoop labor, they 
now suffer from carpal tunnel syndrome, a crippling hand disease.28 
Throughout the country, in rural areas where the tourist industry 
predominates today, poor families (many of them white) piece to-
gether a patchwork livelihood of seasonal wage work, gardening, hunt-
ing and foraging, and cooperation among kin and neighbors. Two 
areas of the country in particular have suffered from the disappearance 
of once thriving, rural-based economies. Along the back roads of New 
England, off the beaten track in Vermont, New Hampshire, Maine, and 
parts of Massachusetts, families contend with depressed economic con-
ditions, as they have since the decline of commercial farming in the 
early nineteenth century. Their plight is quite similar to that of the 
people of Appalachia, where the coal mining industry collapsed in the 
1960s, leaving behind few sources of well-paying, stable, year-round 
employment.29 Indeed, these problems pertain to service workers in 
tourist industries throughout the country; the wealthier the resort, the 
more difficult the lives of hotel and restaurant employees who can-
not afford to live near their jobs, and must commute long distances 
each day.30 
Over the generations, distressed rural areas have sent millions of 
migrants out west, up north, and into cities. Not all of those migrants 
have been able to integrate themselves economically into their new 
home areas. For example, the neighborhoods of Lower Price Hill in 
Cincinnati and Uptown in Chicago contain pockets of migrants who 
pursue illpaid daywork because they lack a foothold in local industry. 
In the Midwest, in particular, some migrants from Appalachia remain 
profoundly ambivalent about leaving their ancestral homes; they travel 
back and forth between West Virginia and Ohio, with great frequency, 
neither setding in a new place nor completely abandoning their old 
26 See id. 
27 See Bates, supra note 24, at 23. 
28 See id. 
29 For a description of the tenuous and ephemeral nature of wage labor in the Apalachian 
region, see RHODA HALPERIN, THE LIVELIHOOD OF KIN: MAKING ENDS MEET 'THE KENTUCKY 
WAY' 116-30 (1990). 
30 See, e.g., Harlan C. Clifford, For Staff, Mountain High is Pocketbook Issue, BOSTON GLOBE, 
May 30, 1995, at 3. 
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one. Of his visit to Lower Price Hill, for example, author Jonathan 
Kozol wrote, " ... the place left me disheartened. The children were 
poor, but with a kind of poverty I'd never seen before. Most were not 
minority children but the children of poor Appalachian whites who'd 
settled in this part of Cincinnati years before and led their lives in 
virtual isolation from the city that surrounded them. "31 
Returning to the countryside, we note the proliferation of so-
called stranded communities, towns and villages that have lost their 
economic mainstays to Mexico or southeast Asia, to the merger and 
consolidation movement of the 1980s, or to cuthroat economic com-
petition. These communities include places like Waterloo, Iowa, which 
lost the bulk of its manufacturing and food-processing jobs when the 
Rath Meatpacking Plant and the John Deere farm machinery factory 
cut their work forces drastically in the late 1980s.32 In Hamlet, North 
Carolina, black and white workers alike suffered the devastating effects 
of a fire at the town's largest employer, the Imperial Food Products 
chicken processing plant, in 1991.33 The fire took the lives of 25 workers, 
and the subsequent closing of the plant forced people in the surround-
ing area to make difficult choices betwen going on welfare or commut-
ing to service-sector jobs many miles away.34 Noted one observer, "The 
loss of a major employer, compounded by the deaths, exposes an 
industrial backwater here. Hamlet's economy is sinking, and its people 
are too poor, too locked into their unsalable trailers and weather-
scarred houses, or too bound to their families to leave. "35 
The inner-city ghettoes which claim so much of our attention 
today are of course the product of historic, political forces; they were 
created by the decisions of big-city mayors, federal housing authority 
administrators, politicians in both political parties, bankers and real-
estate agents, and so-called suburban neighborhood improvement as-
sociations. Since the 1960s, some black folks have managed to move 
out of the ghettoes and into the suburbs or stable working-class neigh-
borhoods. Although geographers have identified sixteen metropolitan 
areas in the Midwest, Northeast, and South as "hypersegregated" areas 
31JONATHAN Kozol, SAVAGE INEQUALITIES: CHILDREN IN AMERICA'S SCHOOLS 229 (1991). 
32 For a discussion of the desolation gripping areas within rural America, including Waterloo, 
Iowa, see generally OSHA GRAY DAVIDSON, BROKEN HEARTLAND: THE RISE OF AMERICA'S RURAL 
GHETTO (1990). 
33 Peter T. Kilborn, In the Aftermath of a Deadly Fire, a Poor Town Struggles Back, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 25, 1991, at l. 
34 See id. 
35Id. 
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by virtue of their large, concentrated black populations, inner-cities 
today also include substantial numbers of Latinos, and in some cases, 
recent immigrants from allover the world.36 
Whether located in the nation's largest cities or in a decaying New 
England mill village or a small southern town, enclaves of South East 
Asian and Central American war and revolution refugees can also be 
classified as distressed communities. Because of their ethnic and racial 
diversity, and because of severe local shortages of housing and good 
jobs, these places are real and potential sites of civil strife. Two notable 
examples include the Mount Pleasant area of Washington, D. C., home 
to a large number of recent Central American immigrants, and of 
course South Central Los Angeles, where a historially poor black popu-
lation has been forced to compete with Mexican and other Latin 
American immigrants for scarce jobs and resources. 
Native-American reservations-especially those in the Far West 
which have not instituted casinos and other forms of legalized gam-
bling-represent prototypical poor places. Consider for example the 
Navajo Nation of Arizona, with its unemployment rate of 85 percent, 
and no industrial employment within commuting distance; and the 
Pine Ridge Reservation, home to 16,000 Sioux in South Dakota, ap-
proximately two-thirds of whom live in poverty.37 By any measure of dis-
tress-alcholism, mortality, suicide rates, broken families, poor hous-
ing, and joblessness-Pine Ridge Reservation is, in the words of one 
observer, "as poor as America gets .... "38 
Another type of distressed community results from the depletion 
of natural resources, and the subsequent erosion of a traditional way 
of life in certain areas of the country. Fishing towns and villages along 
the northeastern coast are now reeling from the effects of diminished 
reserves along the continental shelf. The plight of these communities 
is a case study illustrating the ways in which natural and man-made 
forces, economic and political pressures, and foreign and domestic 
policy makers have combined to threaten the economic basis of a 
specific region of the country. Hard hit by competition from foreign 
"factory trawlers," the fishermen in towns like Gloucester and New 
36 See DOUGLAS S. MASSEY AND NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND 
THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 10, 18 (1993). 
37 See Peter T. Kilborn, Sad Distinction for the Sioux: Homeland is No. 1 in Poverty, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 20, 1992, at 1. 
38 See id. 
1996] WAR ON THE POOR 9 
Bedford, Massachusetts, rejoiced when, in the mid-1970s, Congress 
passed legislation to protect their preserves within two hundred miles 
of the U. S. coastline.39 However, new and sophisticated fishing tech-
niques-the use of sonar and computers to locate fish, for example-
hastened the depletion of cod, haddock, and flounder.40 Faced with 
shrinking natural resources and the high costs necessary to outfit new 
boats, many fishermen have abandoned the sea as their source of 
livelihood, and turned to jobs in food processing plants or fast-food 
restaurants.4! To many families, then, the loss of a fishing business 
signals more than the loss of a traditional, kin and community-based 
way of life; it signals economic hardship for their families. And whole 
towns, like New Bedford, are forced to debate new and unpredicatable 
strategies for revitalizing their communities without an infusion of 
capital, knowing that even new bed-and-breakfasts and national park 
sites will never provide the economic basis for a stable communitiy of 
workers employed at good jobs on a year-round basis.42 
Finally, it seems ironic to identifY some distressed communities as 
victims of the "peace dividend" and the end of the Cold War. However, 
it is not difficult to detect emerging pockets of poverty in parts of 
previously affluent regions of the country-on Long Island, in Con-
necticut, in California and the Northwest. For example, Groton and 
New London, Connecticut, are in the process of losing big defense 
contractors like Electric Boat (owned by General Dynamics), McDon-
ald Douglass, and Boeing. As these employers scale back their opera-
tions, a whole host of secondary services will wither and die. First to 
go will be the restaurants and dry cleaning establishments, the book-
stores and movie theaters. Soon the schools, with their shrunken prop-
erty tax base, will begin to deteriorate. Mechanics, engineers, and 
white-collar workers will either have to move out or hope that they and 
other family members can piece together a living from part-time jobs 
or contract labor. It might seem odd to include recently affluent towns 
in my list of distressed communities, along with historically poor places 
like the Mississipi Delta and certain Indian reservations. Neighbor-
hoods that until a couple of years ago depended on a thriving Cold 
War defense industry that employed thousands of highly skilled work-
39 See Timothy Egan, Hook, Line and Sunk, N.Y. TIMES Dec. 11, 1994, (Magazine) at 78. 
40 Id. at 76, 78. 
41 Deborah Cramer, The One that Got Away, MOTHER JONES, july-Aug. 1994, at 40. 
42 Egan, supra note 39, at 78-79. 
10 BOSTON COLLEGE THIRD WORLD LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 16:1 
ers would seem to have little in common, at least at this particular 
moment in history, with places that have coped with long-term inter-
generational poverty for generations. Yet my point is that even newly 
distressed communities are undergoing a process not unlike that of 
their older counterparts-the loss of a local, stable economic base, and 
the consequent decline in the quality of employment, education, and 
a whole host of other services. 
II. THE "SWEDISH DREAM" AND AMERICANS 
IN DISTRESSED COMMUNITIES 
Clearly, all of the distressed communities that I have described 
here have different histories. But whether these communities origi-
nated in the conquest of an indigenous people (the Navajo Nation in 
Arizona); in the institution of slavery (in the Mississippi Delta); in the 
collapse of mining and manufacturing industries (Cranks Creek, Ken-
tucky, Gary, Indiana); the great migrations of the twentieth century 
(inner-city Detroit, Lower Price Hill, Cincinnati); repression and civil 
strife around the world (communities of Haitian refugees in Florida, 
Cambodians in Massachusetts); or major economic or political upheav-
als around the world today, they all share certain readily identifiable 
characteristics. 
Foremost among these characteristics is a shortage of good jobs 
for people with little in the way of skills or formal education (good jobs 
are defined as ones that are stable, well-paying, and that carry health 
insurance and other benefits). For example, the recent history of 
South Central Los Angeles offers insights into the civil disturbances in 
that area in the spring of 1992. In the 1970s and 1980s, the community 
lost plants belonging to Firestone, General Motors, Goodyear, and 
Bethlehem Steel. Meanwhile, a large influx of undocumented Latino 
immigrants made the competition for menial jobs and daywork even 
more desperate than it had been previously. The recent arrival of 
relatively well-to-do Korean immigrants, men and women who could 
afford to open their own stores, heightened class and ethnic tensions 
within a community that held out little economic promise for the poor 
of any ethnic or racial group. 
In the United States today, the place where you live determines 
the quality of educational and health services that you and your family 
receive. Most distressed communities rely on the property tax for 
funding their educational systems. This simple fact presents us with a 
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time-honored truism: the poorest neigh born hoods have the poorest 
schools-rundown, understaffed, and overwhelmed by the health and 
emotional issues that daily plague large numbers of their students. In 
effect, education in this country is commodified, as is health care. That 
is, one's access to these resources is contingent on the relation of one's 
family to the labor market. My study of generations of poor black and 
white people in this country suggests that poor health has been a major 
factor in their inability to secure, or keep, a job. Too many poor 
workers have had to take untimely, and uninsured "early retirement" 
because of ill health, and too many of them have had to relinquish 
their jobs in order to care for family members whose health problems 
were created or exacerbated by the lack of preventive care. This nexus 
of unstable employment, inadequate education, and poor health dev-
astates men and women in poor communities, and their ability to care 
for one another.43 
Changes in the larger economy therefore have a direct impact on 
the affective component of family relations. In Waterloo, Iowa, the 
disappearance of blue-collar jobs pushed husbands, wives, and their 
high school-aged children into the service sector to work at all hours 
of the night and day. Gone were the family and community rhythms 
that reflected the factory workday-on the job at 8 A.M., out of work 
by 6, with time in the early evening to eat dinner togther as a family 
and then go off to a bowling league or a church meeting. All-night 
supermarkets, nursing homes, and fast-food restaurants claimed the 
energies of family members who found it harder to find the time 
and sit down and enjoy each other's company. These developments 
reflected not a decline in Waterloo's "family values," but rather adjust-
ments by households to a new local economy, one marked by the 
decline in unionized, blue-collar jobs of the past. 
Another characterstic common to all of these distressed commu-
nities is some sort of underground economy. The violent drug trade 
of inner cities is illuminated by the harsh glare of the media spotlight 
today. But, in fact, most poor communities (regardless of their racial 
composition or geographical location) include some sort of under-
ground economy: entrepreneurs trafficking in fake green cards, AFDC 
mothers who are baby- sitting for their neighbors or otherwise earning 
money "off the books and under the table," and immigrants presenting 
43 See, e.g., Laurie Kaye Abraham, MAMA MIGHT BE BETTER OFF DEAD: THE FAILURE OF 
HEALTH CARE IN URBAN AMERICA (1993). 
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forged social security cards to potential employers. I do not want to 
downplay the issue of violent crime that afflicts so many poor neigh-
borhoods today, in the rural South as well as the urban North, only to 
suggest that criminal activity of that sort often overshadows a more 
general (nonlethal) impulse among many poor people to create op-
portunities for themselves outside the confines of the legal, paid labor 
force. Finally, residents of all poor distressed communities today face 
a historic conflict between their desire to seek out a better life for 
themselves and their children on the one hand, and their desire to 
honor kin loyalties and obligations on the other. The history of migra-
tion in this country belies the notion that the poor are fatalistic and 
passive. To the contrary, the poor have been the most mobile of all 
classes, always searching for a job that pays a little more, a street that 
is a little safer, or an apartment that is a little bigger. However, geo-
graphical mobility is fading as an option for many poor people. In a 
nationally depressed economy, no particualr place beckons to the poor 
and ambitious the way the Lower East Side of New York City did in the 
early twentieth century and the way the Sun Belt did in the 1970s. 
Moving has become an exceedingly expensive proposition-getting a 
phone installed; paying the security deposit for a new apartment; 
transporting one's belongings, no matter how modest, across town or 
cross-country. Again, I want to stress that the immobility of the poor 
today reflects not necessarily a change, or decline in their values, 
as much as new constraints imposed by the realities of the labor 
market. 
As a nation we are not only moving in the direction of a two-tier 
society-the people who possess good credentials, good jobs, high 
salaries and health benefits versus those who work long hours at un-
skilled jobs in service industries-but we are also showing signs of an 
economic aristocracy. More and more, we are who are parents are (or 
were). A recent study suggests that, of all the factors that account for 
a young man's ability to earn a middle-class income before the age of 
thirty, parents' income was more decisive than either a college educa-
tion or a white skin.44 In other words, "the poor were becoming more 
likely to stay poor and the affluent more likely to stay affluent."45 This 
finding is not surprising, considering the fact that parents' income 
(that is, where they can afford to live) directly affects their children's 
education, health, and general well-being. Because some Western Euro-
44 See Keith Bradsher, America's Opportunity Gap, N.Y. TIMEs,June 4,1995, § 4 at 4. 
45Id. 
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pean countries are demonstrating higher rates of upward social mobility 
among the poor, we might consider substituting the "Swedish Dream" 
for the "American Dream" as shorthand for the hope, the belief, that 
hard work and talent will take any young person as far as he or she 
can go up the ladder of job and financial success.46 
III. THE PROBLEM WITH THE "UNDERCLASS DEBATE." 
This brief overview of distressed communities and the families 
who live in them suggests that the sources of poverty are not difficult 
to identifY, but that they will be very difficult to eradicate. Our economy 
produces poverty as naturally as it produces prosperity. In a loosely 
regulated free market economy (both national and international), 
workers remain at the mercy of larger economic trends that many 
people applaud-the lowering of trade barriers, the processes of tech-
nological innovation and corporate consolidation. In the absence of 
countervailing forces, like strong unions and aggressive government 
intervention in the economy, people who live in distressed communi-
ties will continue to suffer from a crisis in family well-being. 
Much of the political discourse on poverty today focuses on the 
themes of culture and values. Conventional wisdom suggests that the 
poor are very different from you and me because they hold less dear 
the "values" that the rest of us abide by-a love of family and concern 
for the welfare of children. Yet viewed from the perspective that I have 
stressed today-a long-range, historical perspective-the catch-phrase 
"decline in family values" seems hopelessly inadequate to help us 
understand the large-scale structural forces that are affecting American 
families regardless of race or ethnicity. Furthermore, too often the 
term "family values" is used to indict mothers of all kinds-middle class 
mothers who choose to work instead of staying home full time with 
their children or poor AFDC recipients who choose to stay home with 
their children instead of working for wages. 
Likewise, the term "underclass," with its implied focus on the black 
population of northern inner cities, distracts us from the fact that, as 
I have suggested, poverty is a multiethnic, multiracial phenomenon, 
and that the problem of poverty affects a wide range of places outside 
black ghettoes. A larger (that is, political) inattention to distress on the 
countryside leads to an unfortunate series of unstated assumptions. For 
example, "underclass" theorists would have us answer the following 
46 See id. 
14 BOSTON COLLEGE THIRD WORLD LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 16:1 
questions in the affirmative: Is it not better to suffer a slow death from 
tuberculosis in Belle Glade, Florida, than to be killed in a shootout in 
the South Bronx? Would you not rather watch your child die of star-
vation in rural Texas than of an overdose of crack in South Central 
Los Angeles? Is it not better to focus our energies (in the form of 
research grants and pilot programs) on black single mothers in the 
ghetto than on white single mothers in rural Appalachia? 
We should refrain from making the choices posed by these ques-
tions; better yet, we should refrain from asking these questions at all. 
This discussion of distressed communities contains a number of 
implicit policy recommendations that are worth making explicit now. 
As a nation we must confront head-on the personal hardship created 
by a post-industrial economy, and initiate a number of dramatic poli-
cies and programs-public-private cooperation in the creation of new 
jobs; a drastic increase in the minimum wage, so that family members 
can earn a living wage; universal health-care for all Americans; subsi-
dized child-care and housing for poor families; a federal system of 
worker retraining for those men and women who need to re-enter the 
labor forces with a new set of skills; measures designed to achieve 
educational parity between schools in poor and rich neighborhoods; 
and finally, a new conception of citizenship, one that links decent jobs 
and health care with more traditional notions of collective rights and 
responsibilities. These suggestions might have received some support 
from liberal Democrats in years gone by; however, in today's mean-spir-
ited political climate, it is by no means certain that even the most 
modest of these measures would win substantial support from elected 
officials of either major political party. 
The policy makers and pundits who provide a blow-by-blow ac-
count of our so-called culture wars suggest that the root of our prob-
lems is a conflict of belief systems-those who uphold the integrity of 
family ties versus those who do not. In these ahistorical times, however, 
it is essential that we locate the roots of poverty in history, and that we 
understand that poverty results from a crisis in politics and not from 
a crisis in values. The forces that are sweeping the globe today are not 
impersonal forces, but rather the products of political decisions about 
who shall work, who shall live where, who shall prosper and who shall 
falter. The purest, strongest family values in the world will not guaran-
tee men, women, or children the economic wherewithal to sustain 
those values. Our hope lies in a revitalized and even reorganized 
political system-one based on the premise that the access to a decent 
job, decent education, and decent medical care are just as fundamental 
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to the welfare of the country as the right to vote and the right to free 
speech. Until American citizenship is redefined in these terms, we will 
continue to live out the future that the past has laid before us; a future 
in which all the turbulence of the new world order is reflected in the 
everyday struggles of husbands and wives, the everyday struggles of 
parents and children. 

